Revisiting 1947 Partition & Its Unfinished Business: A Treaty-Based Framework for Minority Protection in the Indian Subcontinent.

Pakistan was created in 1947 during the horrific Partition of the then British‑ruled India, when the British divided the region along religious lines. Areas with Muslim majorities were grouped into Pakistan. These Muslim regions were not connected geographically. One part became West Pakistan in the northwest of India, and the other became East Pakistan in eastern Bengal, with Residual India in the middle, with its arms chopped off. Leaders believed that a shared Muslim identity would unite these two regions, even though they spoke different languages and had different cultures (Jahan, 1972; The Cambridge World History of Genocide, 2023).

Britain rushed the partition as it withdrew from India, leaving behind poorly planned borders and creating conflicts that set the stage for future conflict. Muhammad Ali Jinnah pushed for the creation of Pakistan as a Muslim homeland. At the same time, Jawaharlal Nehru readily accepted partition as a compromise. Mahatma Gandhi supported the partition, though he tried to oppose the violence, but failed to prevent the split or preserve communal unity (Ahmed, 2002). The main shortcoming of all parties was underestimating how deeply language, culture, and power imbalances – especially between East and West Pakistan – would weaken the new states and lead to war (Jahan, 1972; The Cambridge World History of Genocide, 2023).

Deep problems grew between the two regions as West Pakistan controlled politics, the military, and the economy, despite East Pakistan’s larger population. The government’s push for Urdu angered Bengali speakers and fueled unrest (Jahan, 1972; The Cambridge World History of Genocide, 2023). East Pakistan also received less development, prompting protests. In 1971, military repression triggered a refugee crisis and drew Indian support for East Pakistani forces, leading to Bangladesh’s independence (Jahan, 1972; Beachler, 2007; The Cambridge World History of Genocide, 2023).

The Non-Muslim Challenge

During the 1947 Partition, mass violence erupted across North India and Bengal, leading to the deaths of up to two million people and the displacement of millions more – a humanitarian catastrophe that produced waves of refugees and communal tensions that reverberated for decades (Ahmed, 2002). Sikhs and Hindus in many regions were brutally targeted as part of reciprocal communal violence in the final months of British rule and the first weeks after independence (Ahmed, 2002).

From partition to today, non-Muslims in Bangladesh and Pakistan have faced repeated violence, discrimination, and fear rooted in historical and structural marginalisation. During the 1971 Bangladesh Liberation War, Bengali non-Muslims continued to be disproportionately targeted by Islamists and military operations that scholars and human rights researchers characterise as genocidal in intent, involving mass killings, sexual violence, and forced displacement (Beachler, 2007; The Cambridge World History of Genocide, 2023; Jahan, 1972). Since 1971, attacks on temples, homes, and businesses have continued, and minority communities report that many perpetrators have gone unpunished and that domestic and international mechanisms for justice remain uneven (Communal violence in Bangladesh, 2023; Feldman, 2022).

In Pakistan, the non-Muslim minorities, which includes Sikhs, Jains, Buddhists, Christians, Parsis along with Hindus has remained small and vulnerable since 1947, facing periodic reports of kidnappings of adults and children, forced conversions and marriages at gunpoint, communal violence, legal discrimination, and structural disadvantages that academic studies link to majoritarian policies and socio‑political marginalization (Feldman, 2022; Comm. violence in Bangladesh, 2023).

Policy Solutions

Non-Muslim communities face systemic discrimination, insecurity, political marginalisation, and restricted rights (Hafeez, 2023; Hussain, 2023), with no real legal recourse, while Muslims in India retain full constitutional parity with non-Muslims (Banerjee, 2023). Partition thus raises questions of nationalism and citizenship. The failure to implement population exchange has entrenched asymmetric outcomes, leaving non-Muslims persistently disadvantaged across the subcontinent (Ahmed, 2002; Jahan, 1972; Hafeez, 2023). Scholars argue that resolving these tensions is central to justice, internal security, and the legitimacy of citizenship in post-partition India (Hussain, 2023; Beachler, 2007).

The following policy measures build on historical precedent, offering a framework to address these longstanding inequalities. The 1950 Nehru–Liaquat Pact was a bilateral agreement between India and Pakistan aimed at safeguarding the citizenship, security, property, and political rights of religious minorities in both states following the violence and displacement of Partition (Nehru & Liaquat Ali Khan, 1950; Talbot & Singh, 2009). India should now pursue a multilateral treaty with Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Afghanistan – a successor to the Nehru–Liaquat Pact, incorporating the following provisions. Given that population exchange was never realized, an alternative and honorable settlement would involve:

1) All Muslims of the combined territory of India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh could be declared citizens of Pakistan, and therefore be able to vote in Pakistani and Bangladeshi national elections in a proportionate way (the formula between the two can be negotiated). This move reflects the 1946 elections, in which Muslims from Residual India overwhelmingly supported Pakistan and Muslim League candidates. The reform would close the historical gap between the act of state creation and the right to ongoing political representation. Similarly, all non-Muslims in the combined territories of India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh could be declared citizens of India and could vote in the Indian national elections.

2)To complement the above point about electoral citizenship, establish a shared India–Pakistan–Bangladesh–Afghanistan Commonwealth Green Card providing reciprocal residency and work rights to religious minorities, i.e. Muslims in Residual India and non-Muslims in Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Afghanistan. This mobility framework provides economic security and personal autonomy while maintaining electoral representation as the primary channel of political participation.

This framework allows Muslims in Residual India and non-Muslims in Pakistan and Bangladesh to live, work, and pay taxes like local residents under reciprocal Green Cards, while maintaining citizenship and voting rights in their designated successor states.

3) The treaty would guarantee the safety, security, and justice of all communities by making human rights abuses justiciable across borders. Cases of persecution would be tried in the courts of the victim’s designated national state and enforced by the law enforcement of the state where the abuse occurred—for example, non-Muslims persecuted in Pakistan, Bangladesh, or Afghanistan would have their cases heard in Indian courts and enforced locally, while Muslims persecuted in Residual India would have their cases heard in Pakistan, Bangladesh, or Afghanistan and enforced in India.

Political representation is essential for ensuring that all communities have a voice in the laws and policies that affect their lives. In societies shaped by religiously defined histories, members of specific religious groups should have the opportunity to exercise their vote in accordance with the political structures that best reflect their collective identity and historical self-determination. The aforementioned outlined treaty-based framework would not reopen partition but complete its unfinished legal and moral settlement by aligning citizenship, political rights, and security with the realities partition itself created. Without a thoughtful mechanism of this type, religion-based vulnerability will remain structurally embedded, perpetuating instability, injustice, and unresolved trauma of nationality, legitimacy, and loyalty across the Indian subcontinent.

References & Readings

Ahmed, I. (2002). The 1947 Partition of India: A paradigm for pathological politics in India and Pakistan. Asian Ethnicity, 3(1).

Banerjee, S. (2023). Citizenship, minorities, and secularism in India. Springer.

Beachler, D. W. (2007). The politics of genocide scholarship: The case of Bangladesh. Patterns of Prejudice, 41(5).

Beachler, D. W. (2011). The genocide debate: Politicians, academics, and victims. Palgrave Macmillan.

Bose, S. (2011). The question of genocide and the quest for justice in the 1971 war. Journal of Genocide Research.

Communal violence in Bangladesh. (2023). Communal violence in Bangladesh: A study of the underlying factors and trends. Journal of Intercommunal Studies.

Cambridge World History of Genocide. (2023). Cambridge University Press.

Feldman, S. (2022). Displacement and the production of difference: East Pakistan/Bangladesh, 1947–1990.

Hafeez, M. (2023). Religious minorities in Pakistan: Human rights and social challenges. Religions, 12(1).

Hussain, I. (2023). Hindu minorities in Bangladesh: Political participation and social vulnerability. South Asia Studies Journal.

Jahan, R. (1972). Genocide in Bangladesh. Columbia University South Asia Institute.

Nehru, J., & Liaquat Ali Khan. (1950). Agreement between the Governments of India and Pakistan regarding security and rights of minorities (Nehru–Liaquat Pact). Government of India.

Talbot, I., & Singh, G. (2009). The Partition of India. Cambridge University Press.